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Abstract This paper discusses ethical issues surrounding Integrated Assessment
Models (IAMs) of the economic effects of climate change, and how climate economists
acting as policy advisors ought to represent the uncertain possibility of catastrophe.
Some climate economists, especially Martin Weitzman, have argued for a precaution-
ary approach where avoiding catastrophe should structure climate economists’ welfare
analysis. This paper details ethical arguments that justify this approach, showing
how Weitzman’s “fat tail” probabilities of climate catastrophe pose ethical problems
for widely used IAMs. The main claim is that economists who ignore or downplay
catastrophic risks in their representations of uncertainty likely fall afoul of ethical con-
straints on scientists acting as policy advisors. Such scientists have duties to honestly
articulate uncertainties and manage (some) inductive risks, or the risks of being wrong
in different ways.
Keywords Climate change · Economics · Catastrophic risk · Inductive risk ·
Environmental ethics · Research ethics
1 Introduction
How should climate economists acting as policy advisors deal with the uncertain pos-
sibility of climate catastrophe? Martin Weitzman and others have urged that avoiding
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catastrophe should frame climate economists’ welfare analysis.1 On this precaution-
ary approach, we should think about climate policy as paying to reduce the risk of
catastrophe as opposed to “smoothing consumption” over time. This paper discusses
ethical assumptions that justify this approach and argues that Weitzman’s “fat tail”
probabilities of climate catastrophe pose an ethical problem for widely used Integrated
Assessment Models (IAMs) of the economic effects of climate change.2 Economists
who ignore or downplay catastrophic risks in their representations and amalgamations
of uncertainty may fall afoul of ethical constraints on scientists acting as policy advi-
sors. Such scientists have duties to honestly articulate uncertainties and manage (some)
inductive risks, or the risks of being wrong in different ways. However, considerations
related to Weitzman’s own “dismal theorem” show that this precautionary approach
has unique ethical limitations as well, especially due to the difficult threshold analysis
required by this approach in setting the “value of statistical civilization”.
In Sect. 2, I present Weitzman’s argument against commonly used IAM damage
functions, showing how he motivates his precautionary approach. Here I discuss his
“dismal theorem,” which shows that fat-tail catastrophes can dominate climate cost-
benefit analysis at the limit, driving willingness to pay to reduce the risk of catastrophe
to infinity or a high upper bound. In Sect. 3, I offer an argument that, since scien-
tists working as policy advisors have duties to honestly articulate uncertainties and
manage inductive risks, or the risks of being wrong in various ways, they may be
ethically obligated to include fat-tail catastrophic risks in their economic analyses of
climate change, since these models have ethically significant consequences when used
in policy-making or governmental cost-benefit policy analysis. In Sect. 4, I discuss
objections and limitations.
2 Climate economics and “fat tail” climate catastrophes
Most contemporary discussion of ethics in climate economics has focused on two
families of ethical issues: intertemporal discounting (intergenerational justice) and
cost allocation for mitigation and adaptation (intragenerational justice). These issues
of equity arise in the context of IAMs used to determine the “optimal” price for
carbon by estimating the marginal social cost of emissions, for example Nordhaus’s
DICE and RICE models (Nordhaus 2013). These models use the Ramsey equation to
determine the discount rate, which, as Jamieson (2014, pp. 118–122) and others have
demonstrated, encodes discounted utilitarian value judgments about intertemporal and
intratemporal inequality, as well as risk, a third important area of ethical concern and
the focus of this paper.3 Outside the context of the Ramsey equation, IAMs deal
1 See Weitzman (2007, 2009, 2012, 2014). Throughout, welfare analysis refers to economic cost-benefit
analysis and its components, e.g. attempts to estimate the social cost of carbon.
2 The definition of ‘fat tail’ used by Weitzman (2009) is that a probability density function has a fat tail if
the tail approaches 0 more slowly than exponentially, i.e. when its moment-generating function is infinite.
3 The Ramsey equation explicitly encodes value judgments about intertermporal equity insofar as it attempts
to determine the optimal social discount rate for welfare analysis. It also implicitly encodes value judgments
about intratemporal equity because the parameter for the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, often
interpreted as a measure of inequity aversion, could be applied to the intratemporal case. But as Frisch (2017)
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with risk by estimating economic damages of climate change and parametrizing risk
aversion. This paper focuses here, specifically on the “damage functions” of IAMs.
Figure 1 below depicts the default damage functions of three main IAMs, which were
used by the US Federal Government’s Interagency Working Group under the Obama
administration to estimate the cost of carbon for regulatory rulemaking cost-benefit
analysis (Interagency Working Group 2010; Greenstone et al. 2011).
IAMs generally assume that our economies will continue to grow and the eco-
nomic future will be roughly like the economic past. However, it is also possible that
anthropogenic climate change will lead to radically disruptive, catastrophic scenarios,
e.g. massive population reductions due to emerging diseases, resource scarcity, or the
collapse of ecosystems, the end of human societies as we know them, perhaps even
human extinction. For example, one catastrophic scenario is explored in Oreskes and
Conway’s (2014) speculative future history, where climate change leads to the “col-
lapse of western civilization.” Leaving out details, it is widely assumed that warming
of 6 or 7 ◦C would make such catastrophic outcomes more likely than 2 ◦C.4
The idea that increasing warming will lead to increasing economic damages is
built into the damage functions, which take information about climate change and
economic growth under various scenarios and map degrees warming onto economic
damages for welfare analysis (Fig. 1). Weitzman (2009) argues that commonly used
damage functions do not sufficiently take into account catastrophic possibilities if
they extrapolate deterministically from damage estimates at low amounts of warming.
These extrapolations are based on functional forms (quadratic, exponential) chosen
largely for two reasons: they fit the assumption that damages will increase faster
than linearly in temperature, and they are analytically tractable. No deeper scientific
rationale for the shape of these functions has been proposed (Weitzman 2009, p. 16;
Pindyck 2013). Furthermore, except for the PAGE IAM, these damage functions do
not explicitly (probabilistically) represent any relevant uncertainties.
Of course, uncertainties surrounding IAMs come from multiple sources, since there
are several inferences that must be made in an IAM to get to an estimate of economic
damages. On the natural scientific side, one must infer warming from atmospheric
CO2; on the social scientific side, damages from warming. On the former, uncertain-
ties include those surrounding the climate sensitivity parameter, defined as the amount
of warming expected given a doubling of atmospheric CO2, as well as possible “tip-
ping points” beyond which the climate system might respond in discontinuous and
potentially disastrous ways. These unlikely but high-impact scenarios include run-
away warming due to massive methane release or collapse of the Atlantic Meridional
Footnote 3 continued
points out, IAMs that simply ignore intratemporal inequality (i.e. global wealth inequality and resulting
unequal vulnerability) by modeling society as a series of representative consumers, thereby arguably encode
non-egalitarian value judgments as well, since decisions made on their basis would likely tend to maintain
such inequalities.
4 Determining which outcomes count as “catastrophic” is as much a value judgment as determining what
counts as “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” For the purposes of this paper,
I need not precisely define ‘catastrophe.’ The kind of outcomes that are relevant to Weitzman’s argument,
involving “unlimited downside exposure,” collapse of civilization, etc., would be agreed by all reasonable
parties to be catastrophic.
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Table 1 From Wagner and Weitzman (2015, p. 54)
CO2e concentration (ppm) 500 550 600 650 700 750 800
Median temperature increase ◦C 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9
Chance of > 6 ◦C increase (%) 1.2 3 5 8 11 14 17
Overturning Circulation. On the latter, social scientific side, uncertainties include the
role of technology in adaptation and mitigation, the substitutability of natural and
human-made capital, and effects of extreme warming on resource scarcity and global
security.
First, consider uncertainties surrounding climate sensitivity, or more generally the
relationship between emissions and overall warming. According to Weitzman’s recent
amalgamation of the IPCC’s climate models, even if the world stabilized at 550 ppm
CO2e, there would still be a significant, non-zero probability (∼ 3%) of exceeding 6 ◦C
(11 ◦F) warming (see Table 1 below, reproduced from Wagner and Weitzman 2015).
By 700 ppm, the chance is 11%. However, as I discuss below, Weitzman (2009) argues
that even if one were to use a relatively thin-tailed probability density function (PDF)
for climate sensitivity (e.g. the Normal distribution), uncertainties about feedbacks like
those mentioned above (methane release, massive failure of carbon sinks, etc.) should
“fatten” the tails of this PDF if they were incorporated in a Bayesian fashion. This
resulting PDF is much more uncertain about the reaction of the climate to emissions.
Second, consider uncertainties surrounding the damage function itself, which takes
degrees warming and maps it onto economic damages, usually in terms of loss of
global GDP. (Put aside normative limitations of focusing on GDP as the sole measure
of economic damages). Figure 1 illustrates existing disagreement amongst climate
economists; for example, up to about 3.5 ◦C warming, the most optimistic of the dam-
age functions (FUND) lies outside of the 95th percentile of damages predicted by
PAGE. Furthermore, many different damage functions can be fit to existing data that
have widely divergent results at higher degrees of warming. This is demonstrated by
Weitzman (2012, pp. 234–235), who compares the popular quadratic damage func-
tion with one that is more “reactive” at higher degrees warming. As Frisch (2013)
argues, the deepest problem with the damage functions on offer is that, if they are
based on empirical data at all, they must use data on the effects of very small climate
changes around recent averages on economic variables, to infer damages at much
greater climate changes with greater variability. Even the most advanced recent work
on this topic, for example Burke et al. (2015), only use data from recent years (in
their case, 1960–2010), comparing individual countries’ economic output in cooler-
than-average vs. warmer-than-average years. Using this data set to extrapolate out of
sample introduces significant uncertainty.
Given the inherent uncertainties of such extrapolation, one might reasonably worry
whether we can honestly infer from damages at 1 or 2 ◦C to damages at 6 ◦. Indeed,
Tol (2012), who is relatively optimistic about the economic effects of climate change,
attempted to represent existing uncertainty in damage functions by estimating a PDF
for damages by “vote counting” from existing studies, and found that greater than
123
Author's personal copy
Synthese
Fig. 1 Damage functions for three widely used IAMs, from Interagency Working Group (2010). Note that
only PAGE’s function incorporates probabilistic uncertainty
7 ◦C of warming could lead to a “total welfare loss,” (97) obviously much greater
than losses predicted by the functions shown in Fig. 1. Weitzman’s “dismal theorem”
(2009) shows that for a simplified case, high-impact, low-probability catastrophes in
the “fat tail” of a PDF for damages include the possibility of “unlimited downside
exposure” or the complete elimination of consumption or GDP, and can thus dominate
cost-benefit analysis (CBA).5
As mentioned above, Weitzman’s central claim is that this “immense cascading
of huge uncertainties” surrounding the inferences in IAMs (the climate sensitivity
parameter, economic damages, etc.) ought to be explicitly represented in Bayesian
fashion, resulting in a fat-tailed posterior PDF of what he calls “welfare sensitivity” to
climate change (2009, p. 6). Putting the argument informally, the idea is that “fat tails
conjoined with fat tails beget yet-fatter tails.” (2009, p. 4) More formally, the posterior-
predictive distribution Weitzman derives for this idealized welfare sensitivity random
variable for a simple case is the Student-t distribution, which has an undefined or
infinite expectation. Thus deep uncertainty generates a (negative) infinite expectation
in an expected utility calculation, so considerations of catastrophic risk can dominate
CBA of climate change for sufficiently risk-averse decision-makers. The absurd result
of the dismal theorem is that a risk-averse decision-maker should be willing to pay an
unlimited amount of money at the margin to avoid catastrophe (“unlimited downside
exposure” due to the collapse of human civilization, etc.).6
Weitzman’s result poses technical and ethical problems for fat-tailed CBA (of cli-
mate change and other social decisions with existential implications), as well as ethical
problems for commonly used IAMs. Weitzman suggests avoiding the absurd result of
5 As Nordhaus (2012) points out, this follows from Weitzman’s definition of a “fat tailed” distribution as
one whose moment-generating function is infinite, i.e. its expectation is infinite.
6 Technically, the decision-maker’s utility function exhibits “Constant Relative Risk Aversion”.
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the dismal theorem requires setting an upper bound on the disutility of catastrophe akin
to the commonly used “value of a statistical life” (VSL) in CBAs involving mortality
risks. VSL, a controversial economic construct, represents the (monetary) value of
saving a human life. It is often inferred from surveys or economic behavior involving
mortality risks and is commonly used in climate economics, health economics, and
other areas that involve risks of death. One might “scale up” a suitable VSL to come
up with a finite societal willingness to pay to avoid total loss. Weitzman interprets
this theoretical upper bound as an analogous “value of statistical civilization as we
know it” (2009, p. 6). While he is doubtful that any particular value could be given an
ethically sound rationale, it seems likely that a wide range of reasonable values could
be contemplated, and quite possible that even the higher estimates for aggressive mit-
igation costs would be lower than society’s aggregate willingness to pay to avoid the
loss of human civilization. However, setting such an economic “value of statistical civ-
ilization” inherits the ethical problems inherent in VSL-like inferences, for example
whether it is normatively legitimate to infer a VSL from empirically observed behav-
ior involving mortality risks in the first place. Additional ethical complications arise
due to the scale of the task, for example, whether the value of statistical civilization
is merely the sum of the value of the statistical lives involved, or whether there ought
to be non-additive effects. Given the sensitivity of any analysis to different values of
this controversial and under-explored construct, this is a major challenge to such an
analysis. On the other hand, an important ethical problem indicated for commonly
used damage functions is that they risk being far too optimistic insofar as they do
not adequately incorporate the uncertain fat tail risks of total catastrophe. The DICE,
FUND, and PAGE damage functions with their default modeling assumptions shown
in Fig. 1, for example, are clearly more optimistic than Weitzman’s probabilistic model
of welfare sensitivity.
In a recent study, Dietz (2011) does not attempt to estimate the VSL-like parameter
directly, but follows Weitzman’s advice by performing an empirical fat-tailed climate
CBA with the stochastic IAM PAGE. Dietz suggests that while we might try “scaling
up” the value of a statistical life to entire societies to produce this upper bound,
instead his CBA works with a parameter representing the “maximum proportion of
net consumption that could feasibly be lost” to bound the analysis. Thus instead of
assuming that the decision maker has some finite willingness to pay to avoid total
loss, it simply truncates the space of feasible outcomes to exclude total loss at some
high percentage, e.g. loss of 99% of consumption relative to the baseline. Table 2
below shows Dietz’s results of the marginal damage costs per ton of CO2 (2008 $US)
when this parameter is set at .99, for different (relatively low) utility discount rates
and values for the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.
These results show that for an empirical fat-tailed climate CBA, the specification
of parameters in the Ramsey equation like the discount rate still have significant
effects on results. Catastrophic risk does not eliminate the effect of the discount rate,
especially since plausible climate catastrophes are 100 years or more away. While
Weitzman is right that amalgamating uncertainty by incorporating catastrophes via fat
tails dramatically increases the mean estimated social cost of carbon, the uncertainty
around these values is also notably large. Considering mean values, while they are
not exactly comparable since they used higher discount rates and 2007 $US for the
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Table 2 From Dietz (2011, p. 537). Estimates of marginal damage costs of t/CO2 2008 $US upper bound
on proportion of consumption lost at .99
Scenario Discount
rate
Elasticity of
marginal utility
of consumption
5% marginal
damage cost
Mean marginal
damage cost
95% marginal
damage cost
Business-as-usual
emissions (IPCC
A2)
.1 1 21.13 444.65 1861.64
1.5 3 4.67 346.21 1358.54
550 ppm
stabilization
(IPCC A2)
.1 1 26.70 377.61 1740.83
1.5 3 4.49 224.41 335.10
year 2010, none of the US Government’s Interagency Working Group’s estimates for
the same IAM (PAGE) for the year 2010 closely approach Dietz’s mean values. For
example, they estimate at a 2.5% discount rate the mean 550 ppm stabilization social
cost of a ton of carbon in 2010 to be $42.9 (Interagency Working Group 2010, p. 26).
The details and particular numbers are less important than the point that amalgamating
the uncertain possibility of catastrophe via a fat-tailed damage PDF greatly increases
mean estimates for the social cost of carbon, and its uncertainty, other things equal.
The most optimistic IAMs, e.g. Tol’s FUND model, tend to estimate the social cost of
carbon much lower.
Weitzman claims that this fat-tailed approach to climate CBA is a version of (or,
perhaps, is entailed by) a suitable precautionary principle. For those who do not take
the precautionary principle and CBA to be mutually exclusive approaches, this makes
intuitive sense, since proponents of the precautionary principle have argued that we
ought to take (cost-effective) steps to avoid plausible environmental catastrophes, even
when the probabilities of such catastrophes are unknown or unknowable (Steel 2015).
Weitzman’s approach, which still uses expected utility theory, is also precautionary
insofar as it amalgamates catastrophic uncertainty into the PDF for welfare sensitivity
or damages, thus increasing the decision-relevance of climate catastrophes whose
probabilities are low but not precisely known. Weitzman states that,
The general point is that [the dismal theorem] embodies a very strong form
of a “generalized precautionary principle” for situations of potentially unlim-
ited downside exposure. From experience alone one cannot acquire sufficiently
accurate information about the probabilities of disasters in the bad tail to
make [expected utility] independent of the VSL-like parameter—thereby poten-
tially allowing this VSL-like-parameter aspect to dominate CBA applications
of [expected utility] theory under conditions of potentially unlimited liability.
(2009, p. 12)
Here Weitzman explains how his dismal theorem embodies a precautionary approach
to expected utility CBA: when catastrophic loss is possible, and the probability of this
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loss can only be roughly represented with fat tailed PDF, the decision-maker is forced
to explicitly consider a “VSL-like-parameter,” i.e. their willingness to pay to avoid
catastrophic loss. Thus, although the analogy is not perfect, Weitzman has framed this
approach to climate CBA as “insurance” against catastrophe (Weitzman 2012). Even
when couched in the terms of expected utility theory, this approach is precautionary in
the way it represents catastrophic uncertainty. Other approaches attempt to take into
account catastrophic possibilities in more optimistic ways. For example, the damage
function of Nordhaus’s DICE model incorporates economic impact of high-impact,
low-probability catastrophes via a “survey of experts” (but formally rules out total loss)
and the version of PAGE used by the Interagency Working Group includes a “damage
sub-function” for catastrophic impacts (Interagency Working Group 2010, pp. 6–7).
However, these methods do not result in nearly as high estimates for the social cost
of carbon as the fat-tailed approach does; more importantly, they do not frame the
analysis specifically on what we are willing to pay to avoid worst-case scenarios in
the fat tails.
What might justify Weitzman’s fat-tailed approach as opposed to those used, for
example, by the Interagency Working Group? The next section constructs an ethical
argument for Weitzman’s fat-tailed precautionary approach to the amalgamation of
uncertainty, by appealing to duties of scientists acting as policy advisors.
3 Ethics of climate economics: representing uncertainty and managing
inductive risks
This paper assumes that use of economic CBA of climate change policy could be
justified on broadly welfarist grounds, and policy-makers ought to avail themselves
of such analyses for decision support.7 I do not assume that CBA ought to determine
policy; rather it should be used as one tool among many in a broader context of
deliberation. The obvious use for policy makers is estimating the social cost of carbon
to set a reasonable carbon tax or to estimate costs and benefits of regulations that affect
emissions. The focus of this paper is the ethics of the economist’s role as scientific
advisor in constructing and presenting a CBA, not the decision-making role of policy-
makers. I assume that policy-makers ought to follow the overwhelming consensus of
climate economists in imposing some climate economic policy, e.g. a carbon tax or
cap-and-trade scheme. (In other words, the social cost of carbon is obviously non-
zero.) The question is whether and how the economist qua policy advisor ought to
structure a CBA to incorporate uncertain catastrophic possibilities. In this section I
explore the implications of two ethical norms: (1) scientists ought to manage so-called
inductive risks by considering the non-epistemic consequences of being wrong; and (2)
scientists ought to honestly and explicitly represent uncertainty for policy-makers. I go
on to suggest that these (occasionally competing) ethical ideals may justify Weitzman’s
fat-tailed approach.
7 Thus in this context I am putting aside, for example, the popular objections that the problem of value
incommensurability dooms CBA as a policy-making tool (Anderson 1993; Steel 2015) or claims that welfare
cannot be adequately represented by a CBA (see Frisch 2013, Sect. 4, and references therein).
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Rudner (1953) claimed that scientists acting as advisors to decision-makers should
take contextual or non-epistemic values into account when setting the burden of proof
for scientific claims, more specifically the “alpha-level” or significance level in clas-
sical statistics. Rudner argued that the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments
insofar as they incorporate the context’s inductive risks, or the risks of being wrong,
that decision-makers implicitly take on when they act according to a classical statis-
tical decision rule informed by the scientist’s acceptance or rejection of hypotheses.
In his example, Rudner’s scientist uses a higher alpha-level (lower burden of proof)
for testing the quality of belt buckles than for testing the quality of drugs, since the
inductive risks in the latter context are more ethically significant. This assumes that
the decision-maker will act according to the classical statistical decision rule that says:
release the drugs/belt buckles just in case the hypothesis that the drugs/belt buckles
are defective is rejected at the level of statistical significance set by the scientist.
Jeffrey (1956) responded in Bayesian fashion, arguing that scientists could simply
hand over (posterior) probabilities to decision-makers and allow them to make deci-
sions according to their own values and decision rules. They could also just hand over
their p-values, or even raw data. Douglas (2000, 2009), Elliott (2011), Steel (2015),
and others have responded to Jeffrey by arguing that higher-order inductive risks arise
in epistemically unforced methodological choices, so even Bayesian posterior proba-
bilities may be implicitly value-laden. For example, epistemically unforced decisions
about prior distributions and parameters in a Bayesian analysis for a policy-maker
raise the possibilities of underestimating or overestimating uncertainty, which might
have ethically significant downstream consequences. Similarly, choices about oper-
ationalizing key concepts, characterizing ambiguous data, etc. can have downstream
consequences, raising inductive risks even for a scientist using Bayesian statistical
analysis.
Jeffreyans respond by claiming that instead of managing non-epistemic inductive
risks, scientists ought to make all uncertainties, including higher-order uncertainties,
explicit for the decision-maker, for example by methodological sensitivity analysis
(Betz 2013). The practical challenges for this “Jeffreyan value-free ideal” of making
all scientific uncertainties and higher-order uncertainties explicit are daunting. For
example, Steele (2012) argued that scientists qua policy advisors make implicit value
judgments about inductive risks if they must translate their scientific beliefs and results
into another “language” that policy-makers can actually understand (e.g. from PDFs to
qualitative or linguistic representation of uncertainty), since as the translation is epis-
temically underdetermined and these decisions might have significant downstream
consequences. This kind of translation might be necessary more generally since pol-
icy makers may not understand probabilistic or other scientific representations of
uncertainty, or methodological sensitivity analyses, or be able to competently use
these in their decision-making in ways that are logically sound. Additionally, higher-
order uncertainties associated with methodological decisions might be so pervasive
that avoiding implicit inductive risk value judgments is simply impracticable.8 Due to
these and other considerations, Elliott proposed a principle he called the “no-passing-
8 For a discussion of the limits of this Jeffreyan ideal in the context of a case study of natural scientific
climate modeling, see Frank (2017).
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the-buck” principle, which says that scientists have duties to manage inductive risks
when “it is…socially harmful or impracticable for scientists to respond to uncertainty
by withholding their judgment or providing uninterpreted data to decision makers”
(2011, p. 55).
Even when some inductive risk management is unavoidable for the practical reasons
surveyed above, it arguably remains a duty for the scientist to honestly and, when possi-
ble, explicitly articulate uncertainties for policy makers. Thus Rudner et al. and Jeffrey
et al. can be seen as articulating somewhat distinct, and sometimes competing, duties
for the scientist acting as a policy advisor. The former emphasize the scientist qua
policy advisor’s largely non-epistemic duties to consider the possible consequences of
error given the practical, decision-making context; the latter emphasize the scientist
qua policy advisor’s largely epistemic duties of scientific integrity and honesty. This
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic duties (or values) is not an absolute
one; for example, duties of scientific honesty and research integrity are arguably both
epistemic and ethical.9 Furthermore, the inductive risk argument shows that ethical
and other non-epistemic considerations cannot be cleanly separated from the episte-
mology of applied sciences. However, in the context of the scientist acting as policy
advisor, duties to manage inductive risks plainly appeal primarily to non-epistemic
goals as opposed to the epistemic goals of science as an engine of reliable knowledge
production. These epistemic goals include the production of true (or approximately
true) well-confirmed theories with predictive and explanatory power, goals which
might be pursued independently of any number of non-epistemic goals. The duty to
articulate scientific uncertainties in Jeffrey’s sense appeals to these epistemic goals
of the scientist, who, in Jeffrey’s ideal case, presents a rational decision-maker with
probabilities over relevant outcomes so that she may make a decision according to her
own values.
The non-epistemic duties to manage inductive risks may be derived from gen-
eral duties to consider the non-epistemic consequences of our actions (Douglas 2003),
while the epistemic duties may be derived either from general duties of honesty or else
role obligations specific to expert policy advisors (Shamoo and Resnik 2015). These
might conflict; for example, a scientist might judge herself obligated to deemphasize
uncertainties when those would be misused or misinterpreted by cynical policy-makers
to delay action on an issue like climate change. Depending on the nature of those uncer-
tainties, one might think this constitutes unethical manipulation of the policy-maker.
However, in complex policy-relevant fields like climate science, scientific uncertain-
ties will abound (at the very least, plausible “unknown unknowns”), so the scientist
must choose which uncertainties to make explicit, which to emphasize, and which to
leave aside. This problem is especially acute given the weaponization of normal scien-
tific uncertainty by various actors to delay policy action on important environmental
problems, documented by, e.g. Oreskes and Conway (2010). In a context closer to Jef-
frey’s ideal case, the same scientist might make as many relevant uncertainties explicit
as possible for policy-makers. In these contexts, policy-makers are able to understand
and competently use explicit representations of uncertainty and are unlikely to manip-
9 However, see Longino (1996) for an argument that this distinction ultimately breaks down. I thank an
anonymous reviewer for pushing this point.
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ulate them to serve predetermined policy goals (Frank 2017). Thus, in any particular
context, these pro tanto duties might have to be weighed against each other, along with
other relevant considerations.
These general duties might entail a more specific duty for the climate economist
using an IAM to follow Weitzman’s fat-tailed approach to the economics of climate
catastrophe. Consider epistemic duties. First, we might weakly assume that a fat-tailed
PDF for economic damages merely accurately represents the subjective beliefs of the
economist about uncertainty surrounding future damages, as it does for Weitzman and
others. (It does not for, e.g. Nordhaus 2012, however the stronger arguments below
might apply to such economists insofar as they act as policy advisors.) Then, insofar
as the scientist has a duty of subjective honesty to accurately convey their beliefs to the
policy-maker, they would be (pro tanto) obligated to use this approach. The stronger,
more interesting case is one where we interpret the epistemic duty as implying, at the
very least, being consistent with extant evidence and meeting standards of the relevant
expert communities for the probabilistic representation of uncertainty. Simplifying a
bit, according to these standards, the fat-tailed PDF for damages might be epistemically
permissible or epistemically impermissible. For now, assume that it is epistemically
permissible according to these standards; I will deal with the objection that the fat-
tailed PDF for damages is epistemically impermissible or, relatively impermissible,
in the next section. Given the significant scientific uncertainties discussed in the last
section, it is plausible to assume that both the fat-tailed approach and a thin-tailed
approach are both epistemically permissible. This leaves considerations of inductive
risk management.
According to all users of IAMs, there is significant higher-order uncertainty about
these models’ structure and assumptions, including ethical uncertainties about the
appropriate discount rate, level of risk aversion, etc. (Jamieson 2014; Frisch 2013)
The complex higher-order inductive risks associated with IAMs’ outputs suggest
that economists have some duties to manage inductive risks. Additionally, it may
be harmful or impractical for economists to hand over uninterpreted results or model
specifications, or to construct complex methodological sensitivity analyses. Indeed,
such analyses might obscure expert knowledge or give meaningless results if they
attempt to represent too many uncertainties. That is, Elliott’s “no passing the buck”
principle applies here, at least for some inductive risks. Then, if the inductive risks
associated with incorrectly using a thin-tailed approach are less bad than the inductive
risks of incorrectly using a fat-tailed approach, then this would provide (pro tanto)
non-epistemic justification for using the fat-tailed approach.
To be sound, this non-epistemic justification for using the fat-tailed approach must
hold that the balance of inductive risks favors the fat-tailed approach over a thin-tailed
approach. This is plausible, especially given precautionary considerations, which fits
with Weitzman’s own precautionary interpretation of the fat-tailed approach. Consider,
for example, Steel’s (2015, p. 28) articulation of a relevant precautionary principle: “If
a scientifically plausible mechanism exists whereby an activity can lead to catastrophe,
then that activity should be phased out or significantly restricted.” The scientific plau-
sibility of climate catastrophe is a necessary condition for the epistemic (and thus, in
this context, ethical) permissibility of using the fat-tailed approach. There are of course
risks associated with any aggressive climate change mitigation policy, e.g. setting the
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carbon tax too high, or instituting a high carbon tax without measures to deal with its
possibly regressive distributional consequences. However, these inductive risks that
must be associated with the fat-tailed approach are minor compared with the inductive
risks associated with a thin-tailed approach that would not necessarily justify policies
that significantly reduce catastrophic risk. As Steel (2015, pp. 32–37) argues, there
is no scientifically plausible “counter-scenario” in which this precautionary principle
would incoherently recommend against aggressive mitigation due to a precautionary
interest in avoiding a “mitigation catastrophe”.
One might point to the “mitigation catastrophe” of Weitzman’s own dismal theorem,
a “counter-scenario” to climate catastrophe wherein society pays an arbitrarily large
amount of money to prevent what turn out to be extremely improbable catastrophic
risks. Again, the possible problem with justifying the fat-tailed approach on precaution-
ary grounds is that the same precautionary principle may recommend against it if this
counter-scenario or “mitigation catastrophe” is plausible. However, this unbounded
approach of the dismal theorem would not be epistemically or ethically permissible,
since (1) the counter-scenario is not scientifically plausible, since people’s willingness
to pay to reduce mortality risks is not unbounded; and (2) being unwilling to pay such
an unlimited amount is normatively justified, given unavoidable tradeoffs with reduc-
ing other risks and pursuing other legitimate goals. While Weitzman’s dismal theorem
complicates the balance of inductive risks, a plausible (albeit perhaps unavoidably
somewhat arbitrary) upper bound for the “value of statistical civilization” could per-
haps be set such that the inductive risk of a “mitigation catastrophe” is eliminated,
or outweighed by the catastrophic risk reduction measures encouraged by use of the
fat-tailed approach.
4 Objections and limitations: weighing epistemic and non-epistemic
values
I do not claim to have definitively established that economists ought to use Weitzman’s
fat-tailed approach to climate CBA. Rather I have argued that, on some plausible
assumptions about the duties of scientists acting as policy advisors, and assumptions
about the inductive risks involved, it may follow that other approaches (even ones
that are epistemically permissible) fail to ethically manage the inductive risks at stake
in the climate science-policy nexus. One might challenge the above argument above
in several ways. First, consider the challenge that fat-tailed PDFs for damages are
epistemically impermissible. According to this objection, there are epistemic stan-
dards for the representation of uncertainty such that a fat-tailed PDF for damages
fails to meet those standards. Without going into too much detail, consider the rea-
sons that the Interagency Working Group gives for not using Weitzman’s fat-tailed
approach to incorporate catastrophic outcomes. Firstly, they accurately state that there
are significant “differences of opinion” (2010, p. 29) amongst economists about the
appropriateness and applicability of this approach. Secondly, they point out that the
risk premiums on the social cost of carbon that come out of such models are very sen-
sitive to model assumptions. Neither of these entail epistemic impermissibility. Both
claims are true of every IAM; so, as arguments for epistemic impermissibility they
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would overgeneralize. They go on to state explicitly that there is significant uncer-
tainty associated with the extrapolation of damages at low temperature increases to
high temperature increases, which just is the epistemic rationale that Weitzman gives
for his fat-tailed approach. I return to a version of this objection below. Similarly,
Nordhaus’s (2012) empirical argument against Weitzman uses economic data from
“catastrophic” events in recent economic history to argue that the fat-tailed approach
would overestimate the catastrophic risks of climate change. But such an approach
rests on the undefended assumption that future catastrophes fueled by climate change
will be similar to those experienced in the absence of extreme climate change. This is
exactly the kind of extrapolation that Weitzman’s approach rejects.
Second, one might argue that instead of using the fat-tailed approach, economists
acting as policy advisors should “average all plausible models” as the Interagency
Working Group did with DICE, PAGE, and FUND, or give some weighted average.
I do not have an argument that a Weitzman-style approach alone would better man-
age inductive risks than this approach averaged with other epistemically permissible
IAMs. However, insofar as those other IAMs do not take the significant uncertain-
ties about catastrophic outcomes into account, an average of these other models that
excluded a fat-tailed IAM would be open to the same precautionary argument given
above.
Thirdly, one might argue that balancing epistemic and non-epistemic values or
duties in these contexts is much more complicated than I made it out to be above,
especially since I treated epistemic permissibility as binary where epistemic permis-
sibility (or, overall epistemic value) is a matter of degree. This objection raises deep
philosophical puzzles about how (primarily) epistemic and (primarily) non-epistemic
values or duties ought to be weighed and traded off in various contexts. This poses
a significant problem for my argument insofar as a fat-tailed CBA might be rel-
atively less epistemically valuable than some alternative CBA, even if the former
is ethically more valuable, for example due to considerations of inductive risk and
precaution. This is admittedly the weakest link in the argument. However, the mas-
sive uncertainties surrounding even the best IAMs make judgments of their relative
epistemic value extremely difficult. Thus it might still be justified to regard IAMs
within some reasonable range of expert opinion to be epistemically permissible, and
then choose one or a subset of these on the basis of non-epistemic, precautionary
considerations.
Finally, one might argue that these massive uncertainties associated with IAMs’
damage functions, as well as many other model assumptions, instead of leading us to
prefer a fat-tailed CBA, ought instead to lead us to conclude that no CBA at all might
be better than some CBA. For example, Pindyck (2013) has argued against the use of
IAMs, since modelers can “obtain almost any desired result because key inputs can
be chosen arbitrarily” (p. 870). Weitzman also suggests this in his discussion of the
fat-tailed approach:
Perhaps in the end the climate-change economist can help most by not presenting
a cost-benefit estimate for what is inherently a fat-tailed situation with potentially
unlimited downside exposure as if it is accurate and objective—and perhaps not
even presenting the analysis as if it is an approximation of something that is
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accurate and objective—but instead by stressing somewhat more openly the fact
that such an estimate might conceivably be arbitrarily inaccurate depending upon
what is subjectively assumed about the high-temperature damages function along
with assumptions about the fatness of the tails and/or where they have been cut
off. (2009, p. 18)
Here Weitzman follows Pindyck’s argument that the uncertainties surrounding IAMs
and their sensitivity to countless epistemically unforced assumptions should leave the
economist policy advisor in the position of either emphasizing the low epistemic value
of IAM results, or else avoiding IAM results in the policy context entirely. It is certainly
possible that the epistemic value of IAMs is so low that non-epistemic considerations
and much simpler precautionary reasoning should guide policy instead. However, on
the assumption that epistemic value of IAMs meets some threshold of permissible use,
my argument for using the fat-tailed approach is applicable.
While this Pindyck-style critique of IAMs has significant force, one might distin-
guish types of uses of IAMs. In particular, we should distinguish use of IAMs for
“optimal” decision-making in the high-technocratic style of ideal classical utilitarian-
ism, as opposed to mere decision support for policy-makers. Reiterating an important
point from Sect. 3, CBAs should not—and due to normative and empirical uncertain-
ties, arguably cannot—determine decisions alone; they are one tool among many in a
broader framework of policy-making. At the very least, the function of such idealized
decision models is to make certain features of the actual social decision explicit. In
the case of Weitzman’s model, we are left considering what we are willing to pay
as a society to avoid climate catastrophe. Similarly, Frisch (2013, 2017) has argued
forcefully that the usefulness of IAMs is limited due to multiple empirical and norma-
tive uncertainties, including uncertainties surrounding the damage function discussed
above. However, he suggests,
instead of appealing to optimization IAMs to deliver precise policy recommen-
dations concerning the optimal and most ‘efficient’ path to maximizing overall
utility, we could use IAMs as toy models—as extremely simplified and idealized
representations of the interactions between climate and economic systems—that
allow us to examine a range of plausible futures. (p. 134)
In examining these “plausible futures,” we only have a rough idea of the probabilities
and impacts of various climate-policy outcomes. However even toy models can give
us important, albeit rough, information about the probable costs of more or less pre-
cautionary climate policy. If scientists acting as policy advisors have duties to honestly
and explicitly represent uncertainties to policy-makers but also to manage inductive
risks, Weitzman’s approach that admits deep uncertainty about catastrophic outcomes
strikes a reasonable balance between these duties. The costs of being erroneously too
pessimistic in our economic models of climate catastrophe (economic costs for present
and near-future generations) are more known and more manageable than the possibly
catastrophic costs of being erroneously too optimistic. Indeed, Frisch concludes that
Nordhaus’s strategy of making relatively optimistic assumptions about the economic
costs of climate change seems “astonishingly reckless.” (ibid., p. 135).
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5 Conclusion
I have argued that Weitzman’s argument for a fat-tailed approach to climate CBA may
be justified by ethical norms that apply to scientists acting as policy advisors. There
are significant limitations to this argument, including the question of the balance of
inductive risks and complex conflicts between epistemic and non-epistemic values.
Weitzman’s fat-tailed approach also raises the ethical problem of bounding the analy-
sis to prevent the absurd result of the dismal theorem. That is, it focuses policy makers
on the question of what is an acceptable cost to prevent low-probability, catastrophic
collapse of civilization. In presenting climate change in such stark, existential terms,
it also abstracts away from the—at least equally—important ethical issues of intra-
generational and intergenerational justice. However, this argument deserves explicit
articulation, especially since some major policy makers use IAMs to guide decision-
making, many of which are perhaps too optimistic given existing uncertainties.
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